Revus

Revija za ustavno teorijo in filozofijo prava

Revue de théorie constitutionnelle et de philosophie du droit

Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law

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Revus

Revus est la première revue de théorie constitutionnelle et de philosophie du droit en Europe du Sud-Est. Elle fournit un lieu d’échange unique entre juristes de la région, en publiant des contributions dans différentes langues. L’un de ses objectifs est d’établir ainsi des passerelles entre les juristes académiques de la région, et entre ceux-ci et les juristes d’autres régions du monde.
La revue couvre un champ très large, autour des fondements de nos cultures juridiques : droit constitutionnel, droit international public, théorie et philosophie du droit, droits fondamentaux, État de droit et démocratie. La rédaction de Revus encourage des propositions d’articles qui témoignent d’une réflexion théorique et aussi de perspectives comparatistes.

Revus is the first journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law in South-East Europe. The journal provides a unique regional legal forum by publishing contributions in various languages. One of its purposes is to build a bridge between legal scholars from the region and abroad. It covers a wide range of fields, encompassing the foundations of our legal cultures: constitutional law, international public law, theory and philosophy of law, human rights, rule of law and democracy. The Editors of Revus encourage contributions which exhibit theoretical reflections and comparative perspectives.

Éditeur

Klub Revus

 Centre de recherche sur la constitutionnalité et la démocratie en Europe

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Politique d'accès

Barrière mobile

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Contact

klub@revus.eu

Informations bibliographiques

Voir la fiche de la revue sur d'autres sites

Via le Sudoc

Rédacteur(s) en chef

Andrej Kristan, Luka Burazin

Type de support

Papier et électronique

Etat de la collection

2003-2018

Politique d'édition électronique

Publication en libre accès après un délai de restriction de 2 ans

Périodicité

Semestrielle

Année de création

2003

Date de mise en ligne

30 mai 2013

ISSN format électronique

1855-7112

ISSN format papier

1581-7652

Langues de publication

English, Slovenščina, српски језик, Deutsch, Español, Italiano, Hrvatski, Français

Politique sur les frais de publication

Frais de publication

non

Frais de soumission

non

Politique d'évaluation

Procédure d'évaluation

évaluation en double aveugle

Délai moyen entre soumission et publication

10 semaines

Coordonnées

Courriel

klub@revus.eu

Adresse postale

Revus
Partizanska cesta 6
SI
4000 Kranj
Slovénie

Ville de production

Kranj

Actualités

Nouveau numéro

37 | 2019 – Revus (2019) 37

Revus (2019) 37
  • Symposium on legal normativity
    Revusov forum

    .
    The following reaction papers and critical notes all refer to 
    Brian H. Bix's essay Kelsen, Hart and legal normativity published in Revus (2018) 34.

  • Symposium on risk regulation and tort law
    Revusov forum
    Edited by Diego M. Papayannis

     

    In the previous issue of Revus (2018) 36, we published the main article of this Symposium on Risks regulation and tort law: “Principles of risk imposition and the priority of avoiding harm” by Professor Gregory C. Keating. In that article, Keating argued that quite often safety regulations protect against physical harm and health injury by requiring potential defendants to take more than efficient precautions. These demanding standards of care are rational, contrary to what the economic perspective might suggest, for in general there is an asymmetry between the costs of devastating physical injuries and the economic benefits derived from the untaken precautions.

    In this issue, we present three critical contributions. In “Justice luck in negligence law”, Professor Mark F. Grady qualifies Keating’s proposal as normative, and claims that it is inconsistent with the actual practice of US Courts. In order to apply Keating’s preferred rules, the system should be reformed to prevent juries from “forgiving” negligence, as they do on many occasions where perfect compliance is deemed to be too costly. This might lead us to eliminate juries altogether when the impulse to “forgive” is likely to be strong.

    Next, in “Cost-benefit analysis outside of welfarism” Professor Mark A. Geistfeld highlights that Keating’s rejection of the cost-benefit analysis is unwarranted. Keating seems to identify cost-benefit analysis with welfarist or utilitarianist positions. However, cost-benefit analysis is just a methodology absolutely compatible with a liberal-egalitarian framework. In this way, Geistfeld tries to show that the more demanding standards of care pointed out by Keating in cases where the prospects of physical harm are at stake fit perfectly well within the cost-benefit framework.

    Finally, Professor Dan Priel’s contribution “Do societies prioritize harm prevention?” challenges the very idea that the avoidance of significant risk of physical harm plays a privileged role in actual tort doctrine. According to Priel, the main normative concern of tort law rules is with the distribution of losses. In fact, he argues, it is not obvious that societies do prioritize in general the avoidance of losses. Moreover, he claims that is not clear at all that prevention should be advanced as a goal when the associated costs of doing so are too high.

    This highly stimulating and enlightening debate will be completed with Professor Keating’s reply in a subsequent issue of Revus.